

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 377 IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UR

SUBJECT: 25TH CPSU CONGRESS: BREZHNEV SPEECH (FOREIGN POLICY)

REF: MOSCOW 2919; MOSCOW 2820; MOSCOW 2828

1. SUMMARY. BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED FOREIGN POLICY TO AN EXTENT UNPRECEDENTED IN RECENT CPSU CONGRESS HISTORY, AND MADE STEADINESS AND CONTINUITY THE KEYNOTE THEME. BASICALLY, HE CALLED FOR PIECEMEAL CONTINUATION OF CURRENT POLICY, AND THE HANDFUL OF NEW IDEAS AND PROPOSALS IS FAR LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN THE COMMITMENT TO MORE OF THE SAME. THE MOST STRIKING OVERALL FEATURE IS REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AS THE CENTERPIECE OF SOVIET POLICY, DESPITE COMPLEXITIES AND ENEMIES ABROAD AND CONTINUING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS A LA ANGOLA. COMPARED TO 1971, THE "STRUGGLE TO DEEPEN DETENTE" REPLACES THE "STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM" AS THE MAIN FEATURE OF THE REPORT. BREZHNEV RESTATES SOVIET DETERMINATION TO PURSUE IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.; IS LOW-KEY ON CSCE (AND THE BASKET II-TYPE CONFERENCES HE PROPOSED IN DECEMBER); AND SEEMS CONCILIATORY ON BERLIN. HE IS VERY TOUGH ON CHINA, AND THIS HOSTILITY EXTENDS TO CERTAIN APPARENT NOVELTIES IN TREATMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND JAPAN, WHERE IT APPEARS FORM COMPARISON WITH 1971 THAT CHINA MAKES THE REAL DIFFERENCE. IN THE KEY DISARMAMENT SECTION, BREZHNEV'S REMARKS BREAK NEW GROUND IN SIX AREAS--THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE, NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN MBFR COUNTERPROPOSAL, THE INDIAN OCEAN, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND NON-USE OF FORCE--BUT NOWHERE VERY DEEPLY. THREATMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD IS LOW-KEY DESPITE ANGOLA, BUT SERVES TO INTRODUCE WHAT MAY BE A SMALL

STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION OF WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN FOR SOVIET POLICY. THE LONG SECTIONS ON THE "SOCIALIST COMMUNITY" DO NOT APPEAR TO SIGNAL MAJOR CHANGE, BUT THEY CLEARLY REGISTER THE RENEWED PRIMACY OF SOVIET-EE RELATIONS FOR THE USSR, AND THEY INCLUDE A WARNING TO SOVIET CEMA PARTNERS THAT THEIR RAW MATERIALS MAY DEPEND ON THEIR CEMA COMMITMENTS. ON IDEOLGICAL STRUGGLE, BREZHNEV RESURRECTS THE CONFIDENT ALMA ATA APPROACH ON THE POWER OF "SOCIALIST TRUTH". THE MOST NOVEL PORTION OF THE SPEECH IS THE CONCLUDING SECTION ON THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, WHICH LOOKS LIKE AN ADD-ON AND WHICH BREZHNEV DELIVERED WITH EMOTION: HERE THE SUBSTANCE IS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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"CENTRIST," BUT THE TONE IS HIGH, AND WE SUSPECT THE DRAFTING PROBLEMS WERE SEVERE. END SUMMARY.

2. WATCHING THE FOREIGN POLICY PORTION OF BREZHNEV'S CONGRESS REPORT ON TV--WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN RUSSIAN TEXT--AND COMPARING IT WITH THE 24TH CONGRESS REPORT IN 1971 UNVEILING WHAT EVENTUALLY BECAME THE "PEACE PROGRAM," WE ARE STRUCK BY THE CONFIDENCE AND FIRMNESS IT DEMONSTRATES (AND IS CLEARLY INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE) IN BOTH TONE AND SUBSTANCE. EXCEPT FOR A HANDFUL OF

PASSAGES, IT IS NEITHER MARKEDLY DEFENSIVE NOR MARKEDLY OFFENSIVE IN ITS APPROACH TO ISSUES. RATHER, IT IS RESOLUTELY CENTRIST ON SPECIFICS, AND PURPOSEFULLY STATESMANLIKE IN ITS OVERALL THRUST.

3. FOR THE MOST PART, BREZHNEV CALLS FOR PIECemeAL CONTINUATION OF PROVEN POLICY DIRECTIONS, WITHOUT SPECTACULAR NEW INITIATIVES. EVEN THE SMALL CLUSTER OF NEW "PROPOSALS" AND "TASKS" IS FAIRLY UNIMPRESSIVE, ESPECIALLY IN COMPARISON WITH THE 1971 "PROGRAM". BUT IT IS THIS VERY STEADINESS AND GRAYNESS WHICH CONSTITUTES THE MESSAGE OF THE SPEECH--I.E., THE "PRINCIPLED AND CONSISTENT" FOREIGN POLICY LINE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST DECADE HAS BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS AND WILL BE CONTINUED AS LONG AS THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP REMAINS IN POWER. THUS, FOREIGN POLICY OCCUPIES MORE THAN A THIRD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT, A PROPORTION UNRECORDED IN RECENT CPSU HISTORY.

4. OVERALL, THE MOST STRIKING AND SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THE REPORT IS THE STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME BREZHNEV MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ON THEIR OWN TERMS. HE IS FIRM THROUGHOUT ON THE CONTINUATION OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE "TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS" AND HE WARNS ABOUT THE "FORCES OF REACTION" IN GENERAL AND IN SEVERAL PARTICULAR CASES, INCLUDING THE U.S. BUT BREZHNEV ALSO MAKES CLEAR THAT DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, COMPLEXITIES AND ENEMIES WHICH ABOUND, THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVES THAT DETENTE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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IS THE "LEADING TENDENCY" OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TODAY, THAT MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS, AND THAT THE MAIN TASK OF THE FUTURE IS TO CONTINUE.

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5. A COMPARISON OF THE 1971 AND 1976 "PROGRAMS" REVEALS GREAT CONTINUITY IN SOVIET THINKING. IN 1971 THE CPSU SET ITSELF TEN GOALS: LIQUIDATION OF HOTBEDS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST; FINAL RECOGNITION OF POST-WWII TERRITORIAL CHANGES IN EUROPE; RADICAL TURN TOWARD RELAXATION AND PEACE IN EUROPE; CONVOCATION AND SUCCESS OF CSCE; "EVERYTHING" TO INSURE COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE; TREATIES PROHIBITING NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS;

AND END TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING; REGIONAL NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES AND A FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE; STRUGGLE AGAINST ARMS RACE VIA WDS, MBFR AND MILITARY BUDGETS PROPOSALS; ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, RACISM, ETC. IN 1976, BREZHNEV POINTS WITH PRIDE TO SUCCESSES CONCERNING SOUTHEAST ASIA, EUROPEAN FRONTIERS, CSCE, AND BW, AND SETS THE FOLLOWING EIGHT "MAIN TASKS": INCREASE "SOCIALIST CAMP'S" "JOINT CONTRIBUTION" TO PEACE; WORK AGAINST ARMS RACE THROUGH SALT, MBFR, REVERSING GROWTH OF MILITARY BUDGETS, AND WDC; LIQUIDATE HOTBEDS OF WAR BEGINNING WITH MIDDLE EAST; DO "EVERYTHING" TO DEEPEN DETENTE, ESPECIALLY WITH U.S., WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA "AND ALSO" JAPAN; WORK FOR ASIAN SECURITY; WORK FOR WORLD TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE; ELIMINATE VESTIGES OF COLONIALISM, RACISM, ETC.; REMOVE DISCRIMINATION AND ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INEQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

6. IN GENERAL, THE CENTRAL STRUCTURAL ROLE WHICH THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM PLAYED IN THE 1971 REPORT HAS UNDERSTANDABLY BEEN REPLACED BY THE STRUGGLE TO DEEPEN DETENTE AND MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE, ACCORDING TO SOVIET LIGHTS. IN PRACTICE, THIS MAY NOT AMOUNT TO MUCH OF A CHANGE, BUT AS A PROGRAMMATIC FEATURE IT MAY BE TAKEN AS A SYMBOL OF THE TRANSITION TO A LESS DEFENSIVE, MORE CONFIDENT APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE OVER THE PAST HALF DECADE.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE U.S., BREZHNEV RECYCLES "IMPERIALISM" AS "INTERFERNCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHERS," AND RESTATES SOVIET DETERMINATION TO OPPOSE IT. HE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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CONCLUDES, HOWEVER, THAT "THE SOVIET UNION IS FIRMLY DETERMINED TO FOLLOW THE LINE OF FURTHER IMPROVING SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AND COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN, IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH PEOPLES AND WORLD PEACE."

8. BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON CSCE SEEM NOTABLY LOW KEY AND HIS WARSAW PROPOSAL FOR BASKET II-TYPE CONFERENCES IS ALMOST DISMISSED--"WE SHALL CONTINUE TO APPLY OUR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION, AND EXPECT THE SAME APPROACH FROM ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE."

9. WITH REGARD TO BERLIN, BREZHNEV'S LANGUAGE APPEARS TO GO SOMEWHAT FURTHER THAN IT HAD TO: IN CALLING FOR "STRICT AND COMPLETE OBSERVANCE OF ALL UNDERSTANDINGS" AND COMPLAINING THAT SOME SIGNATORIES" ARE DOING FAR

TOO LITTLE," HE IS ALSO CAREFUL TO STATE THAT "WE VALUE THE COOPERATION ACHIEVED...WITH THE U.S., FRANCE AND BRITAIN" AND THAT "THE SOVIET UNION FAVORS A TRANQUIL AND NORMAL LIFE FOR WEST BERLIN."

10. ON CHINA, BREZHNEV APPEARS SURPRISINGLY TOUGH GIVEN CURRENT FLUID LEADERSHIP SITUATION THERE. AS IN 1971, CHINA STILL APPEARS AT THE TAG END OF THE "SOCIALIST" SECTION" AND THE CONCLUSION OFFERS THE CHINESE A NARROW PATH BACK TO THE "SOCIALIST" FAMILY THROUGH CONCESSIONS TO "MARXIST-LENINIST" (READ SOVIET) POSTULATES. BUT BREZHNEV (TO THUNDEROUS AND SEEMINGLY SINCERE APPLAUSE) ALSO READS CHINA UNDER ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP OUT OF THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" WITH GUSTO, AND THE CONTRAVERSLING REMARK ON NORMALIZING STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS IF FRAMED ENTIRELY IN TERMS OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE." AND THIS HOSTILITY TO CHINA ALSO CREEPS IN BETWEEN THE LINES IN OTHER AREAS: THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE NOVELTIES IN THE SECTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND JAPAN, BY COMPARISON WITH 1971, BOTH CONCERN CHINA.

11. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BREZHNEV INTRODUCES ONE GENUINELY NEW FEATURE, AS WE SEE IT, WHEN HE ANNOUNCES SOVIET LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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PREPAREDNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EFFORT TO END THE ARMS RACE IN THE REGION, PROVIDED IT IS "TIED IN CLOSELY" WITH A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. THE OTHER NOVEL TWIST TO THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION IS THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE COULD PARTICIPATE IN GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY AND INVOLABILITY OF ALL MIDDLE EAST FRONTIERS, EITHER IN THE UN FRAMEWORK OR ON SOME OTHER BASIS. IN 1971, HOWEVER, THE USSR WAS ALSO "PREPARED" TO JOIN OTHER PERMANENT UNSC MEMBERS IN CREATING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE IS THE PRC.

12. WITH REGARD TO JAPAN, BREZHNEV'S LANGUAGE IS, IF ANYTHING, EVEN TOUGHER THAN GROMYKO'S SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE, AND IT IS ALSO STRONGER THAN IN 1971. BUT HERE TOO THE MAIN DIFFERENCE IS CHINA. IN 1971, AS IN 1976, HE PRAISED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND WARNED AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY "CERTAIN CIRCLES" TO EXPLOIT THE "SO-CALLED" TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS. WHAT IS NEW IN 1976 IS THE REFERENCE TO "DIRECT INCITEMENT FROM WITHOUT" ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE, AND THE "HOPE THAT JAPAN WILL NOT BE INDUCED TO TAKE THE ROAD INTO WHICH THOSE EAGER TO REAP ADVANTAGES FROM SOVIET-JAPANESE DIFFERENCES WOULD LIKE TO PUSH HER."

13. IN THE DISARMAMENT SECTION WHICH CONCLUDES THE "TRADITIONAL" FORMAT, WE SEE FIVE ITEMS WORTHY OF NOTE:

--PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO SWAP A BAN ON TRIDENT AND B-1 FOR A BAN ON "SIMILAR SOVIET SYSTEMS" (HE DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS ADVANCED IN CONTEXT OF SALT OR WMD);  
--PUBLIC UNVEILING OF THE EASTERN MBFR COUNTERPROPOSAL, WITH FIGURES;  
-THE CHALLENGE TO THE U.S. TO RECIPROcate WHAT HE CALLS SOVIET SELF-DENIAL ON BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA (WITHOUT ANY SUGGESTION OF BILATERAL DISCUSSION);  
--ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS; AND  
--THE RECYCLING OF THE OLD SOVIET UN NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL INTO A "WORLD CONFERENCE" CONTEXT.  
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OTHERWISE, BEYOND REAFFIRMATION OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL IN USSR'S FOREIGN POLICY, BREZHNEV'S DISARMAMENT REMARKS ARE NOTABLE MAINLY AS CATALOGUE OF FAMILIAR PROPOSALS AND AS OCCASION FOR MOST DEFENSIVE STRAND IN THE WHOLE SPEECH; REPEATED REFERENCES TO WESTERN CAMPAIGN ABOUT A "SOVIET THREAT" DESIGNED BY "ENEMIES OF DETENTE" TO KEEP THE ARMS RACE GOING, "A MONSTROUS LIE FROM START TO FINISH."

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14. THE THIRD WORLD, OR ITS NON-COMMUNIST PART, IS SANDWICHEDE BETWEEN "SOCIALISTS" AND "CAPITALISTS" IN THE SPEECH FORMAT, AND IT RECEIVES LESS EMPHASIS THAN EITHER AND RESTRAINED TREATMENT OVERALL. VIETNAM AND CUBA, OF COURSE, APPEAR IN THE "SOCIALIST" SECTION, AMONG THE TRIUMPHS OF THE "SOCIALIST COMMUNITY," ALONG WITH GDR RECOGNITION. ANGOLA APPEARS AS THE FIRST POSTIVE EX-AMPLE IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION SECTION, AND IS TREATED WITH SATISFACTION BUT WITHOUT GLOATING. THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION STRESSES THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, DESPITE THE "PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS" OF "CERTAIN FORCES" TO UNDERMINE THEM. THE SUCCEEDING SOUTH ASIA PORTION HIGHLIGHTS SOVIET SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA AND "OUR GOOD NEIGHBOR" AFGHANISTAN. AFRICA IS THE RUNT OF THE LITTER, PACE ANGOLA: THE PASSING NOD SIGNLES OUT ONLY THE NEW STATES (GUINEA-BISSAU, CAPE VERDE, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA), OLD AND NEW FRIENDS (GUNEA, CONGO, SOMALIA), AND "ONE OF AFRICA'S BIGGEST COUNTRIES," NIGERIA, FOR HONORABLE MENTION.

15. NEVERTHELESS, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION PASSAGES INCLUDE WHAT SEEM TO BE ONE OF THE FEW REAL NOVELTIES IN THE SPEECH: ANOTHER

SMALL STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION OF WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS A MATTER OF LEGITIMATE CONCERN FOR SOVIET POLICY. IN FORM, IT IS A CHARACTERISTIC AMALGAM OF OLD AND NEW, SINCE IT APPEARS MAINLY UNDER NATIONAL LIBERATION AS RENEWED PLEDGE OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE JUST EFFORTS OF NEWLY LIBERATED PEOPLES TO RESIST IMPERIALISM AND ACHIEVE EQUAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. BUT, MELDED WITH SOVIET DISLIKE OF "DISCRIMINATION" IN TRADE, IT REAPPEARS IN THE CONCLUSION AS A NEW "VITAL TASK" OF THE CPSU, TO ELIMINATE "INEQUALITY, DIKTAT AND EXPLOITATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS."

16. BREZHNEV GIVES VERY HEAVY STRESS TO THE "SOCIALIST COMMUNITY" THROUGHOUT. NOT ONLY DOES INCREASING ITS CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE, WITH THE WHIFF OF INCREASED FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION, APPEAR AS A NEW "VITAL TASK", BUT IT HEADS THE LIST. THE USSR'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAVE RESUMED THEIR TRADITIONAL POSTWAR ROLE AS THE APPLE OF THE SOVIET EYE. AT THE SAME TIME, NEITHER SECTION ON SOVIET-EE INSTITUTIONS (WARSAW PACT AND CEMA) PROPOSES OR SIGNALS A NEW SOVIET PUSH FOR FURTHER INSTITUTIONALIZATION. INDEED, BOTH APPEAR MAINLY TO REGISTER THE STATUS QUO, BY LABELLING IT "PROGRESS." THE PASSAGES ON CEMA ARE PERHAPS LESS ROUTINE THAN THOSE ON THE WARSAW PACT, WHICH HIGHLIGHT THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, LIKE THE 1971 REPORT.

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ON CEMA, BREZHNEV LISTS THE "SPECIAL LONG-TERM PROGRAMS" WHICH WE UNDERSTAND CONSTITUTED THE AGENDA FOR THE ABORTED NOVEMBER SUMMIT AND MAY BE THE AGENDA FOR THIS SUMMER'S COUNCILMEETING: FUEL AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS, FOOD, MANUFACTURED CONSUMER GOODS, MACHINE INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT. BUT HE ALSO UNDERLINES BOTH THE THRUST OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE AND ITS PREFERRED METHODOLOGY WHEN HE DELIVERS A VEILED WARNING TO THE USSR'S CEMA PARTNERS THAT SOVIET DELIVERIES MAY DEPEND ON THEIR FULFILLMENT OF AGREED CEMA COMMITMENTS.

17. BREZHNEV ALSO PUTS CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE COMMUNIST CAMP. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH HIS FIRM STATEMENTS ON CONTINUATION OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE "TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS," THIS COULD BE READ AS SIGNAL FOR MORE STRAIGHTENING OF THE RANKS IN EASTERN EUROPE. IT IS THEREFORE WORTH POINTING OUT THAT HE PUTS A VERY POSITIVE CAST ON THE "SIGNAL", BY REVERTING FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY MONTHS TO THE ALMA ATA THESIS THAT THE "TRUTH OF SOCIALISM" IS POWERFULLY ATTRACTIVE TO HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS ALL OVER THE WORLD. THE STRESS IS ON THE OFFENSIVE POWER OF "SOCIALISM," RATHER THAN THE DANGER OF SUCSSION WITHIN THE COMMUNIST CAMP. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH THE CONFIDENT, FORWARD THRUST OF THE SPEECH AS A WHOLE, AND COULD THEREFORE SIGNAL "STAND AT EASE" AS MUCH AS "STRAIGHTEN RANKS."

18. FINALLY, THE MOST NOVEL PORTION OF BREZHNEV'S REPORT CONSISTS

OF THE LONG CONCLUDING SECTION ON THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. IT GOES BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL FORMAT USED IN 1971, AND BEARS ALL THE EARMARKS OF AN ADD-ON. WHILE HIS OVERALL DELIVERY UNDOUBTEDLY WARMED THE HEARTS OF HIS SUPPORTERS, HE HIMSELF WARMED TO THE TASK OF DELIVERING THIS PORTION, AND APPEARED CLOSE TO TEARS WHEN SPEAKING OF CHILE AND OF THE STATUE HE PROPOSED TO ERECT IN MOSCOW TO COMMUNIST PARTYS.

19. ON BOTH THE "CRISIS OF CAPITALISM" AND THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, BREZHNEV WAS AS CAREFULLY BALANCED AS HE WAS ON OTHER ISSUES. HE CONCLUDED THAT CAPITALISM HAS NO FUTURE, BUT ALLOWED THAT IT ALSO HAS CONSIDERABLE RESERVES. DIVERGENCES IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ARE NATURAL, HE SAID, BUT CANNOT EXTEND TO ESSENTIALS. IT IS THE TONE WHICH SETS THIS SECTION APART, AND LEADS US TO SUSPECT BOTH THAT IT PRESENTED THE MOST SERIOUS DRAFTING PROBLEMS FOR THIS

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CONGRESS, AND THAT THESE "NEW ISSUES" WILL BE AMONG THE THORNIEST THE CPSU WILL FACE AFTER THE CONGRESS.

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PFOR, UR, (BREZHNEV, LEONID I)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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